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7. The United States and global capital 
markets 
Joseph P. Daniels 
INTRODUCTION 
During the Bretton Woods period, central banks were responsible for maintain-
ing pegged exchange values thereby reducing exchange rate risk and currency 
arbitrage opportunities. The existence of significant capital controls made sov-
ereign governments and international agencies the primary source of official 
development financing. The ad hoc system of flexible exchange rates that 
emerged in 1973 through 1976 resulted in a transfer of exchange rate risk, and 
arbitrage opportunities, from government agencies to the private sector. The 
dismantling of capital controls and deregulation of domestic financial sectors 
signalled a willingness of governments to substitute private sector financing for 
official financing by domestic governments and international agencies. 
Liberalization of capital markets, along with increased international trans-
actions in the real sector, have spurred dramatic growth in the international 
money and capital markets. (See Williamson and Mahar (1998) for an excel-
lent essay on financial liberalization.) Daily foreign exchange transactions, 
for example, have grown to nearly $1.4 trillion. This growth highlights the 
importance of today's capital markets in allocating savings worldwide. By 
channelling savings to borrowers, capital market institutions help finance 
domestic investment and direct savings, whether it be domestically and glo-
bally, to their most efficient use, allowing savers to achieve higher risk 
adjusted rates of return. Access to global capital markets allows borrowers to 
pursue investment projects in times of domestic downturns, thus reducing 
domestic business cycles (Eichengreen et al ., 1999). In light of recent financial 
crises, however, many observers have come to question the benefits of unin-
hibited international capital flows and its contribution to real sector investment. 
Eatwell and Taylor (1998) argue that the performance of the financial 
sector must ultimately be judged on its contribution to the real sector in terms 
of long-run trends in employment and growth. In this regard they make two 
important observations. First, trend growth of the G7 economies has slowed 
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to two-thirds of the rate posted in the 1960s. Second, there is disagreement as 
to whether the performance of financial institutions affects medium or 
long-term trend performance of the real sector or if it is determined solely by 
structural aspects of the real sector. 
It is assumed here that the performance of capital markets and financial 
institutions is important for real sector outcomes as it affects public and 
private sector behaviour. Hence, a solvent and sound system of financial 
institutions may promote continued domestic growth and prosperity. Under 
unstable conditions, however, intermediaries may channel capital flows in a 
way that 'undermine domestic policies ' (Crockett, 1997, p. 7), triggering a 
financial crisis. 
The potential costs of these financial crises is abundant. For example, it is 
believed that the costs of the 1980s banking crises in Argentina equalled 
one-half of the nation's GDP while the United States' bailout of banks during 
the early 1990s totalled at least $200 billion. The 1995 real estate collapse in 
Japan resulted in the non-performance of more than $250 billion in bank 
loans. In South Korea more than 10 per cent of all bank loans are 
non-performing. For India and China non-performing loans are estimated to 
be nearly 20 per cent of outstanding loans. Since 1980, the IMF estimates 
that 133 of 181 IMF member nations have suffered banking problems it 
considers to be 'significant' (Lindgren et aI., 1996). 
Further, as has been seen in recent financial crises, banking solvency is 
critical to the operation and stability of the global economy as well. How 
should sovereign governments and international organizations respond to this 
issue? One view is that financial intermediation is inherently an unstable 
business the fortunes of which rise and fail with the business cycle. Hence, 
government regulation and safety nets are required to prevent periodic bank-
ing collapses. Another view is that safety nets themselves create a moral 
hazard problem and may actually be responsible for recent banking crises. 
Regardless of the view taken, it is important to ensure that global capital 
markets operate as efficiently as possible. As capital markets become more 
integrated internationally, therefore, the need for stability, solvency and regu-
lation becomes paramount as financial crises can be magnified. 
This chapter considers these issues, focusing on institutions, market struc-
ture and growth, and risk. The next section considers the basic rationales for, 
and characteristics of, financial intermediation with attention given to the 
unique characteristics of the United States in financing capital investment 
projects. The section after that highlights recent developments in world finan-
cial markets, distinguishing between the money and capital markets, and 
examines the most important development, the increase in capital flows to 
developing markets. The next section explores various sources of risks and 
examines opposing views on regulation, presents recent attempts and propos-
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als for global regulation and questions whether new or old institutions are 
best suited to supervise intermediation. The final section offers a conclusion. 
RATIONALES FOR, AND CHARACTERISTICS OF, 
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 
Financial transactions can be direct or indirect. For example, households may 
allocate wealth to the purchase of a bond issued by a company, effectively 
making a direct loan to that business. In this way, households assist in the 
direct finance of domestic capital investment projects. It is also possible that 
a household may obtain a long-term time deposit at a banking firm. In turn, 
the bank may allocate these funds, together with those of other deposit 
holders, to holdings of bonds issued by the same company as before. In this 
instance, the household would indirectly finance domestic capital investment. 
The bank, in turn, intermediates the financing of the domestic investment. 
The process of indirect finance, or financial intermediation, is the most com-
mon way in which funds are channelled from saving to investment and· the 
financial institutions that fulfil this role are called financial intermediaries. 
The Rationales for Domestic and International Financial Intermediation 
One rationale for the use of intermediaries is the existence of asymmetric 
information. Often lenders are not privy to all of the pertinent information 
about the borrower and the investment project, particularly information about 
risk. The existence of asymmetric information can lead to adverse selection, 
or the potential for those who desire funds for unworthy projects to be the 
most likely to want to borrow or to issue debt instruments. A result of adverse 
selection is that the issuance of poor-quality instruments can make savers less 
willing to lend to or hold debt instruments issued by those seeking to finance 
high-quality projects. Also, poor market information or uncertainty about the 
competence of the financial intermediaries' market may result in herding 
behaviour; that is, when savers follow the behaviour of someone they feel is 
better informed, leading to self-fulfilling outcomes. High-quality banking 
institutions may minimize herding behaviour by depositors. 
A third problem that financial market participants face is moral hazard. 
Moral hazard is the potential that, after they have access to funding, a bor-
rower might engage in behaviour that increases risk - or, in other words, the 
'immoral' behaviour, from the lender's perspective, that the borrower would 
thereby have exhibited. Moral hazard is the primary argument used against 
the recent financial support arrangements offered by the IMF and G7 nations, 
and used to argue in favour of debt restructuring schemes that involve private 
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sector bondholders. Another important reason for agents to use financial 
intermediaries is economies of scale. Financial intermediaries make it possi-
ble for individuals to pool funds together, increasing the scale of possible 
opportunities. In addition, this centralization of management can reduce the 
average fund management costs below the level an individual would incur. 
Financial intermediaries, therefore, exist to save holders of financial instru-
ments from incurring risks and allow them to enjoy reduced costs as described 
above. While these institutions cannot eliminate adverse selection, herding 
behaviour and moral hazard problems, they can collect information, at a 
lower marginal cost, about the underlying riskiness of financial instruments 
and monitor the continuing performance of those who issue such instruments, 
thereby reducing the extent of adverse selection and moral hazard problems 
in the market for these bonds. 
The rationales for international financial intermediation are the same as for 
domestic intermediation. For example, asymmetric-information problems are 
likely to be at least as severe when evaluating the riskiness of foreign finan-
cial instruments as compared to domestic instruments, and therefore the need 
for international financial intermediation is greater. Banks located in various 
countries take part in the process of international financial intermediation by 
using some of the funds of domestic deposit holders to finance loans to 
individuals and companies based in other nations. Most of this international 
banking activity takes place in the Eurocurrency markets. Today, very few 
nations ' capital investment projects are purely domestically financed. Even 
bank-financed investment in the United States increasingly stems from loans 
by non-US banks, with the largest US corporations on average using the 
services of more foreign banks as compared with the average number of 
domestic institutions whose services they utilize. 
As shown in Table 7.1, the world 's largest banking institutions, sometimes 
referred to as 'megabanks', tend to be located outside of the United States. 
By increasing their asset portfolios through regional or world-wide expan-
sion, megabanks may reduce average operating costs, gaining efficiency. The 
evidence for economies of scale in banking is more mixed for US banks than 
for their European counterparts, even though US bank managers themselves 
commonly offer economies of scale as a key rationale for large-scale mergers 
in the United States. 
National Characteristics of Intermediation 
There are several ways in which countries' banking systems and the use of 
banks and market finance differ. The first is the extent to which domestic 
firms use foreign banks relative to domestic banks. US multinationals tend to 
rely on foreign banking institutions to intermediate investment projects to a 
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Table 7.1 The largest banks 
Bank 
Tokyo Mitsubishi Bank 
Deutsche Bank AG 
Sumitomo 
Credit Suisse Group 
HSBC Holdings 
Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank 
SanwaBank 
Credit Agricole Mutuel 
Fuji Bank 
ABN Amro Holdings 
Country 
Japan 
Germany 
Japan 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
Japan 
Japan 
France 
Japan 
The Netherlands 
Note : Based on total assets held on 31 December 1997. 
Source: American Banker, 6 August 1998. 
Assets (US$ billions) 
692 
580 
484 
474 
471 
433 
428 
420 
414 
412 
much higher degree than multinationals of other nations. By the 1990s, for 
example, a typical multinational US finn had accounts with at least as many 
banks abroad as they maintained with US-based banking institutions. 
Another aspect in which national banking systems differ concerns the 
extent to which banks are the predominant means by which firms finance 
their working capital needs. For instance, British, German and Japanese 
businesses use bank loans to finance significantly larger shares of their in-
vestment as compared with businesses located in the United States. In the 
United Kingdom, nearly 70 per cent of funds raised by businesses typically 
stem from bank borrowings. The proportions for Germany and Japan were of 
the order of 50 per cent and 65 per cent, respectively. In contrast, US busi-
nesses normally raise fewer than 30 per cent of their funds through bank 
loans. This difference helps to explain why German and Japanese banks more 
than doubled their size between the 1970s and the 1990s. Though British 
banks grew by less in relative terms, their importance in British business 
finance permitted them to grow faster than US banks, whose overall size, 
adjusted for inflation, failed to change significantly in the two decades fol-
lowing the 1970s. 
There also are differences in market structures across nations. In particular, 
the extent of potential rivalry, often measured by the portion of total deposits 
concentrated within a nation's largest banks, can vary considerably. The top 
five banks in Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain 
and the United Kingdom have over 30 per cent of the deposits of their 
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nations' residents. In Greece and the Netherlands, this figure is over 80 per 
cent. In contrast, the top five US banks account for fewer than 15 per cent of 
the deposit holdings of US residents. With regard to total bank assets, the US 
banking system also appears to exhibit more potential for rivalry among its 
banks, as less than a third of total bank assets are concentrated among the top 
ten US banks. In Gennany, Japan and the United Kingdom, this figure is 
about two-thirds. 
The degree of banking competition within a nation also depends on how 
open the nation's borders are to rivalry from foreign-based banking opera-
tions. By the early 1990s, foreign banks made many loans to US individuals 
and firms, but foreign banks had barely penetrated the German and Japanese 
loan markets. This undoubtedly has played a role in producing the high levels 
of bank asset concentration in Europe and Japan, as shown in Table 7.1. 
Another feature that distinguishes national banking systems is the extent to 
which they permit universal banking, under which there are few if any limits 
on the ability of banks to offer full ranges of financial services and to own 
equity shares in corporations. In Gennany and the United Kingdom, as well 
as in several other European nations, banks face few such restrictions. Japa-
nese banks face greater restrictions on their activities, but many Japanese 
banks have the authority to underwrite stocks and bonds. By contrast, in the 
United States universal banking has been prohibited since 1933, when the US 
Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act. There has been little evidence that 
banks in nations with universal banking are significantly more risky than 
their US counterparts; one of the common arguments against universal bank-
ing. The purchase of Bankers Trust by Deutsche Bank in 1998 highlights how 
disadvantaged US banks are internationally and helped put the removal of the 
Glass-Steagall Act back on the congressional agenda in 1999. 
The legal environment, the level of diversification and the degree of com-
petition are characteristics which are highly interdependent, making it difficult 
to delineate the cause and effect of market outcomes. The result for the 
United States is that US firms rely on foreign banks to a greater extent than 
do their foreign counterparts, yet rely on bank financing to a significantly 
lesser degree overall. Some nations protect their banking industries to a 
higher degree while allowing them to compete in a broader range of services. 
The German and Japanese systems of banks, therefore, tend to have fewer 
institutions, each with a much larger degree of market concentration. 
Some key observations can be made at this point. First, soundness of 
domestic banking systems is important for the efficient channelling of sav-
ings to productive investment projects, and for the heavy costs that banking 
crises can entail. Second, because US firms rely on foreign banking institu-
tions to such a high degree, the soundness and solvency of foreign banks is 
important to US business managers and policy-makers. Finally, because of 
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the extent to which US firms rely on direct intermediation to finance invest-
ment projects, managers and policy-makers must be concerned with the 
reliability and stability of domestic and global capital markets. 
In regard to the first observation, the questions faced by US policy-makers 
are: to what extent should concentration be allowed, at the risk of reduced 
domestic competition; what services should banks be allowed to compete in; 
and what, if anything, should be done to enhance the global competitiveness 
of US banking institutions. To some degree these have been answered, as 
technological advancements, deregulation efforts in the 1980s and increased 
willingness for mergers and acquisitions have slowly eroded the restrictions 
placed on US banks through dual-system regulations and the Glass-Steagall 
Act. Now that these important financial institutions have been considered, we 
next examine how global financial markets have evolved. 
WORLD FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Following the end of World War II, the industrialized nations pursued a goal of 
greater trade liberalization. Not until the 1970s, however, did most industrial-
ized nations begin to liberalize financial markets. Changes in communications 
technology combined with the introduction of innovative new financial in-
struments has moved even reluctant nations to liberalize and deregulate their 
financial markets. The advent of instant and low-cost communications and 
information innovations allows a wider range of firms and individuals to 
participate in international financial markets and to manage their risk expo-
sure more effectively. As a result, since the 1970s the growth of international 
financial markets has far outpaced the growth of international trade in goods 
and services. Savers, as discussed below, have yet to take full advantage of 
these new opportunities. This stylized fact, combined with the usual econo-
metric evidence on parity conditions, indicates that though capital markets 
have become more integrated, they are far from perfectly integrated. 
International Capital Markets 
International capital markets are the markets for cross-border exchange of 
financial instruments which have a maturity of a year or more, or with no 
distinct maturity. Table 7.2 presents evidence on the dramatic growth of 
issues in the international capital markets. Between 1986 and 1996 total 
financing activity that took place on the international capital markets in-
creased by $526.7 billion, or 219.6 per cent. 
Table 7.2 separates the data into two of its most important components: 
international bonds and international equities. A third component of the 
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Table 7.2 Growth o/the international capital market (US$ billions) 
Total 
Securities 
Loans 
1986 
389.5 
195.5 
88.5 
1997 
1769.3 
916.7 
390.4 
Change 
1379.8 
721.2 
301.9 
Percentage change 
354.2 
368.9 
341.1 
161 
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Financial Market Trends. 
international capital markets is foreign direct investment. The international 
bond market, which represents 92 per cent of the international capital mar-
kets, experienced the greatest absolute growth, with an increase of $480.7 
billion. The international equities market, on the other hand, experienced the 
most rapid rate of growth with a fivefold increase over the lO-year period. 
The impact of increased participation of institutional investors has been 
given much attention of late. Deregulation, liberalization and the technologi-
cal advances described earlier create a wider range of savings opportunities 
for individuals through institutional investors. A recent study by the OECD 
(1997) details the size and growth of financial instruments managed by insti-
tutional investors. Table 7.3 presents the OECD's data for the six nations with 
the largest institutional investor activity. As shown, the United States and the 
United Kingdom are two of the nations with the greatest amount of institu-
tional investor activity. The table also shows that between 1990 and 1995 the 
financial assets of institutional investors increased by one-third to one-half 
for the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada. 
Even though the development and growth of the international capital mar-
ket allows individuals and businesses greater opportunities to manage risk 
and increase potential returns, savers do not utilize the international capital 
Table 7.3 Financial assets o/institutional investors (%GDP) 
1995 Percentage change 1990-95 
Canada 87.9 50.0 
Luxembourg 2132.8 0 
Netherlands 158.4 18.7 
Sweden 114.8 34.4 
United Kingdom 162.3 41.7 
United States 170.8 34.1 
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Financial Market Trends . 
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market to the extent we might expect. French and Poterba (1991) find that 
savers demonstrate a low level of international diversification in their portfo-
lios and that most corporate equity is held by domestic residents. 
Table 7.4 provides estimates of equity portfolio weights for US, Japanese 
and UK savers. French and Poterba also estimate the additional return that 
savers must expect in order to justify the low level of international diversifi-
cation. As the table shows, US savers hold almost 94 per cent of their 
portfolios in domestic equities. The estimates of the return on an internation-
ally diversified portfolio are compared with estimated returns on portfolios 
with distributions comparable to British, Japanese and US investors. To jus-
tify the low level of international diversification, US savers must anticipate a 
return on their domestic equity holdings that exceeds the actual return by 
almost 1 per cent. UK savers, due to a smaller overall equity market, have the 
most internationally diversified portfolios of the three nations. To justify 82 
per cent of their portfolio in UK equities, however, UK savers must anticipate 
a return on their domestic holdings that exceeds the actual return by more 
than 4 per cent. 
Table 7.4 Equity portfolio diversification (%) 
United States Japan United Kingdom 
United States 93 .8 1.3 5.9 
Japan 3.1 98.1 4.8 
United Kingdom 1.1 0.2 82.0 
France 0.5 0.1 3.2 
Germany 0.5 0.1 3.5 
Canada 1.0 0.1 0.6 
Excess returns required to justify domestic share of equity portfolio 
(as per cent) 0.9 2.5 4.4 
Source : French and Poterba (1991). 
French and Poterba conclude that these low levels of international diversi-
fication are not due to any national or institutional constraints. The three 
countries in their study have few if any capital controls in place today, and 
tax differences and transaction costs are also very small for these nations. 
The authors conclude, therefore, that the low levels of diversification are due 
to savers' tastes. They speculate that savers perceive a greater degree of risk 
in foreign equity markets because they are less familiar with those markets 
than they are with domestic equity markets. 
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International Money Markets 
International money markets are markets for cross-border exchange of finan-
cial instruments with a maturity of less than one year. Although traders 
exchange a number of different types of instruments in international money 
markets, foreign exchange instruments are most actively traded. As noted 
earlier, the international capital markets have experienced considerable growth 
since the early 1970s. The international money markets, however, have expe-
rienced astounding growth. Economists periodically estimate the volume of 
transactions in the foreign exchange markets based on surveys of the largest 
banks and foreign exchange trading firms . Current estimates of the daily 
activity on the foreign exchange markets indicate that the daily turnover is 
approximately $1.25 billion. On average, the daily volume of the foreign 
exchange market approximates two months of activity that occurs in the New 
York stock exchange market. 
The international money markets are comprised of a number of financial 
instruments other than spot and forward exchange contracts. These instru-
ments include short-term international bank, government and corporate notes, 
and international commercial paper. Because transactions among large banks 
constitute the bulk of international money market exchanges, we can use 
reports of these banks' cross-border asset and liability positions to estimate 
the size of the market. Table 7.5 provides data on the cross-border positions 
for December 1997 and the change in cross-border positions for the year 
1997. As shown, reporting banks had over $8 trillion in both outstanding 
assets and liabilities. The change in these positions for the year 1997 was 
approximately $0.5 trillion. 
Table 7.5 also shows the dominance of the industrialized countries' banks 
in international money markets. Cross-border positions of the industrialized 
countries represents over 78 per cent of the total. The dominance of the US 
dollar, as discussed by Daniels and Davis in Chapter 9, is also apparent with 
the dollar denominating over one-third of outstanding positions. 
Capital Flows and Developing Economies 
Arguably the most important feature of the international financial markets 
is the increased volume of financial flows between nations. Indeed, the 
most striking feature of the 1990s is the increased volume of flows to the 
emerging countries. Figure 7.1 illustrates the rise in total net private capital 
flows for the emerging economies, distinguishing between official net di-
rect investment flows and portfolio flows. As shown in the figure, net 
private capital flows to the emerging economies have risen a dramatic 415 
per cent. 
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Table 7.5 Reporting banks' cross-border positions, December 1997 (US$ 
billions) 
Assets 
Industrial countries 
US dollar 
Other currencies 
All other countries 
Total 
Liabilities 
Industrial countries 
US dollar 
Other currencies 
All other countries 
Total 
December 1997 
7123.6 
3178.1 
3945.5 
1914.7 
9038.3 
6948.7 
3215.7 
3733.0 
1892.2 
8840.9 
Source: Bank for International Settlements. 
Estimated change 
1019.4 
461.3 
558.1 
137.3 
1156.7 
963.6 
419.3 
544.3 
183.2 
1146.9 
As learned from the 1994-95 Mexican financial crisis, it is important to 
recognize the proportion of net private capital flows that are portfolio invest-
ment. Portfolio investment, often referred to as 'hot money', can reverse 
direction quickly, leaving a nation's financial sector in an illiquid position. 
(See Chang and Velasco (1998) for an excellent review of the Asian liquidity 
problem.) Figure 7.1 shows that for the emerging economies, the proportion 
of net portfolio investment increased from 1990 through 1994, representing a 
sizable overall proportion in 1993 and 1994. Much of this is reflected in 
portfolio flows to the Western Hemisphere, or countries such as Mexico, 
Brazil and Argentina. The sizable decline in portfolio flows in 1995 is also 
reflected in the Western Hemisphere data as these flows reversed following 
the Mexican financial crisis, resulting in a drop of $68.3 million in 1995 
alone, representing a 112 per cent decline and overall negative net portfolio 
flows for the region. 
Figure 7.1 also illustrates that the proportion of net portfolio flows to total 
private capital flows differs widely across the various regions. For the Middle 
East and Europe, net portfolio flows account for 42 per cent of total private 
flows, while it is a mere 8 per cent for the transitional economies. Net direct 
foreign investment flows as a percentage of total net private flows range from 
58 per cent for the transitional economies to a scant 7 per cent for the Middle 
East and European economies. 
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RISK AND REGULATION 
As described above, the growth and globalization of financial markets and 
institutions has brought about a vast number of new opportunities for savers 
and borrowers. It has, however, also generated new risks and magnified 
existing risk potential. The four types of risk considered here, in the context 
of globalization and technological advance in financial instruments, are: 
Herstatt risk, legal risk, operational risk and systemic risk. There are a number 
of other types of risk that could be explored, such as liquidity risk and 
settlement risk, but these would be beyond the confines of this chapter. 
Hence, only the most obvious sources are discussed, in brief. 
Risk 
More than two decades ago the impact of Herstatt Risk, or settlement risk that 
spans time zones or systemic risk, was felt. In 1974, German banking regula-
tors closed the failed Herstatt Bank at 3.30 p.m., after the bank had received 
European foreign exchange payments but before it made required payments to 
US banks. Because the US banks did not receive their anticipated payments, 
they were, in many cases, unable to fulfil their own obligations. By the time the 
entire event unwound, US banks had lost as much as $200 million dollars. 
Systemic risk, settlement or credit risk that spills over and effects third 
parties, has been a significant concern following the Mexican crisis of 1994 
and the 1997 East Asian financial crisis. An important aspect of increased 
globalization is the transmission of shocks and the potential for contagion. As 
financial markets become more integrated, the transmission of shocks be-
comes possible and can even be magnified. Such was the case in the US stock 
market crash of the 1980s. Because of intertwined markets, the crash spilled 
into exchanges across the globe. 
As demonstrated in the previous section, there has been a dramatic in-
crease in short-term portfolio flows, particularly to the emerging economies. 
Many of these emerging nations have financial and banking sectors that are 
underdeveloped, not regulated and not properly supervised. When positive, 
these net inflows can put upward pressure on a nation's currency and on 
domestic inflation. On the other hand, they also represent a lower-cost fonn 
of financing, hence lower interest rates, and stimulate a nation 's economy. 
Portfolio flows can, however, reverse direction at rates that quickly exhaust 
the cumulative buildup of years of inflows. In an economy with an underde-
veloped financial sector, these outflows may result in an illiquid banking 
system and put downward pressure on the nation 's currency. Under a fixed 
exchange rate regime, the government is faced with opposing problems: the 
banking system needs additional liquidity while the exchange rate regime 
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Figure 7.1 Net private capital flows to emerging economies, 1990-96 
requires higher interest rates. These hot money flows appear to occur regionally 
as opposed to nationally, with one country serving as the trigger for a re-
gional crisis (Mexico and Thailand, for example). This is the type of problem 
seen in the recent financial and currency crises (see Glick (1998) for a survey 
of the literature in this area) . Empirical work by Glick and Rose (1998) 
indicates that currency crises affect regions or 'clusters' of nations through 
international trade channels. 
As the financial markets have evolved, new and highly sophisticated finan-
cial instruments have been introduced. The use of these instruments often 
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becomes widespread before appropriate domestic regulators and corporate 
managers fully understand their risks and benefits, thereby increasing opera-
tional, or management risk, and legal risk, the risk that the contract cannot be 
enforced by a legal body. The 1995 collapse of Barings Bank illustrates 
operational risk. The same day that Peter Baring had to ask the Bank of 
England to intervene, and the day after the trader involved in the derivatives 
fiasco, Nick Leeson, faxed in his resignation, Barings was to announce and 
award company bonuses, including a bonus to Leeson in the amount of 
£450,000. The total losses to Barings is estimated to be £927 million. (See 
Kuprianov (1995) for case studies on Barings PLC and Metallgesellschaft 
AG.) 
A final aspect considered here is the impact of increased globalization, 
competition and technological advances on bank structure. Regulatory arbitrage, 
the practice of establishing foreign offices to avoid domestic regulation, has 
increased dramatically due in part to technological advances in banking. Glo-
balization and competition have led to increased merger activity and the creation 
of 'mega' banks. Both activities undermine the attempts of sovereign govern-
ments to regulate and supervise national banking institutions. 
Global Regulation 
How should sovereign governments and international organizations respond 
to the risks of increasing financial integration? It is important first to distin-
guish between international financial liberalization and financial regulation. 
Liberalization is the opening up of the financial market to foreign partici-
pants, increasing competition and opportunities for domestic banks. Regulation 
is the governing of the financial sector in order to improve its operation of 
financial intermediation. Obviously, and as evident in the recent financial 
crises, appropriate regulation and supervision is important for the domestic 
financial system to absorb and channel in an economically efficient way the 
inflows and outflows of capital that result from financial liberalization. 
Views of government intervention 
One view of government intervention in the financial sector is that financial 
intermediation is inherently an unstable business the fortunes of which rise 
and fall with the business cycle and that financial markets may have inherent 
imperfections. Hence, government regulation and safety nets are required to 
prevent periodic banking collapses. 
In line with this view, Von Hagen and Fratianni (1998) identify three main 
reasons for financial regulation. The first is that small depositors find it too 
costly to continuously monitor the activities of intermediaries. Hence, small 
depositors need protection from the risk of bank failure. The second is that 
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regulation is required to prevent large withdrawals from one bank that might 
affect the entire industry, or to prevent contagion. The final reason is to 
preserve the integrity of the payments system. The authors assert that these 
types of banking regulation involve the reallocation of risk and therefore 
wealth among market participants. In a global setting this reallocation can 
become quite complex as sovereign governments wish to protect domestic 
residents over foreign residents. 
Another view is that regulation that eliminates competition, and the exist-
ence of safety nets, creates a moral hazard problem and may actually be 
responsible for recent banking crises. This second view has been used exten-
sively to build a critical case against the necessity for international organizations 
such as the IMF. It has played particularly well on the floor of the US Congress 
which begrudgingly approved new funds to the IME 
Regulation and supervision: new or old institutions? 
In spite of recent criticism, there have been a number of well-placed initia-
tives and actions taken in response to the risks described above. Examples are 
the Lamfalussy Report, a 1990 GlO initiative that outlined the legal responsi-
bilities of any intermediary undertaking a large volume wire transfer; the 
Basle Capital Accord for capital adequacy standards; cross-border banking 
principles for consolidated supervision; risk management guidelines for de-
rivatives trading and core principles for effective banking supervision. 
Many of these initiatives resulted from G7 directives. The Halifax and 
Lyon Summits, in particular, addressed the global financial situation. (See the 
excellent volume by Kenen (1996) and the summary by the BIS (1999). 
Directives to the IMF included a request to the IMF to develop procedures to 
provide faster access to IMF credit with strengthened conditionality, to de-
velop standards for data availability and to intensify surveillance beyond 
Article IV policy reviews. The response was an emergency financing mecha-
nism, the Special Data Dissemination Standards, and publication of Article 
IV reviews for those countries wishing the reviews to be public. 
The G 10 was asked to double the credit facilities available to the IMF and 
to review procedures that might prevent or resolve financial crises. The G 10 
responded with a new arrangement that doubled available IMF credit and, as 
a first-step, conducted a survey of market participants and domestic regula-
tions in numerous countries. Based on the results of the survey, the G 10 
emphasized market-based governance and that countries should not expect 
bailouts the 'size of Mexico'. 
Arguably most important, in regard to government intervention, is the 
problem of IMF bailouts. As is frequently argued, unlimited IMF bailouts 
increase the moral hazard of lending and borrowing activities. Jeffery Sachs 
(1998, p. 24) argues that the IMF worked 'mightily and wrongheadedly' to 
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make the world safe for 'naive 25-year-old investment bankers who do not 
know much about world politics' . Bailouts such as that in East Asia should 
cease. 
Recent words of the G8, particularly at the Birmingham Summit, indicate 
that nations should not expect unlimited bailouts. It appears, however, that 
the IMF is continuing to approach problems as it has in the past, and thus 
IMF actions say otherwise. It is vital that the 07/G8 formulate a coherent and 
consistent approach to bailouts in future financial crises. The G7/G8 and the 
IMF must break the expectations they helped create. It is disappointing that 
the strongest statement the leaders could offer at the Birmingham Summit 
was that, 'It is also important to ensure that the private sector plays a timely 
and appropriate role in crises resolution.' US influence is strong in these 
organizations and US officials need to play an activist role in setting the 
agenda. 
In the long term, policy-makers should rethink completely the role of and 
even the necessity for the IMF and the World Bank. They must first realize 
that the IMF is not technically equipped to deal with the types of financial 
crises that occur in the post-Bretton Woods era. Due to the increased integra-
tion of capital markets, the current crises have been fast developing, financial 
in nature and beyond the capacity of the fund and other existing international 
organizations. As an example, the current IMF Manual For Country Econo-
mists states: 'A country will require IMF assistance when it is having balance 
of payments difficulties or, in other words, when the normal inflow of exter-
nal savings is not sufficient to finance its resource gap, which is defined as the 
difference between domestic savings and domestic investment.' 
In addition, the current approach to fund conditionality is counterproduc-
tive. Sachs (1998, p. 25), states that: 
This process [conditionality 1 is out of hand. It has undermined political legitimacy 
in dozens of developing countries, especially since the IMF is often happy to 
conspire with governments to make end runs around parliaments in the interests 
of ' reform'. The contents of IMF programmes are too flawed to be a standard of 
good or poor performance. Markets realize this, so IMF programmes do less and 
less to rally them. 
Finally there must be further discussions on supervisory coordination. 
Primarily an initiative of Canadian Finance Minister Paul Martin, the issue 
should be expanded to include regulatory coordination in order to reduce 
regulatory arbitrage. In contrast to the Martin initiative, however, this should 
not lead to a new supranational body composed of governmental agents. It 
should be delegated to an agency with the greatest comparative advantage, 
perhaps the London Club or the Bank for International Settlements. None the 
less it should be a market-based approach as has been pursued thus far, since 
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in today's financial environment, operational risk is greater than market risk. 
Bank management must therefore be involved. 
CONCLUSION 
Financial intermediaries play an extremely import role as they channel sav-
ings to borrowers and help finance domestic investment. The solvency of a 
nation's system of banks is critical for the stable flow of capital and contin-
ued growth and prosperity. Unfortunately, history has shown that financial 
systems and intermediaries are quite fragile. As one might suspect, given the 
increase in international capital flows, very few national capital investment 
projects are financed purely by domestic intermediaries. Given the height-
ened level of integration, a nation's system of intermediaries is now exposed 
to new sources of risk. These risks must be measured and managed in a 
global context, presenting challenges for financial managers and regulatory 
authorities and creating a need for coordinated efforts. US policy-makers 
should take an active role in ensuring that a market-based approach continues 
to be pursued in addressing these challenges. 
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